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ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS AS HARASSMENT: 
THE THREAT TO FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTED SPEECH IN THE  
AFTERMATH OF DOE V. REED 
Elian Dashev* 
 The recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Doe v. Reed called into 
question the effectiveness and, potentially, the legitimacy of the 
economic boycott as a tool to counteract the influence of Major 
Political Players in the electoral process—despite the protection that 
such boycotts have been afforded historically under the First 
Amendment. The holding in the case was very narrow: the Court 
deemed constitutional as a general matter the compelled disclosure of 
the names of the supporters of a referendum. However, in dicta, the 
Court acknowledged that disclosure could be subject to an as-applied 
challenge if there were a reasonable probability that disclosure would 
subject the signatories to “threats, harassment, or reprisals.” Indeed, 
included in the plaintiffs’ allegations of retaliation was a fear of 
economic boycotts. This Note argues that the Court should not allow 
Major Political Players to use economic boycotts, whether threatened 
or actual, as a justification for exemptions from disclosure 
requirements in as-applied challenges. To do so would undermine the 
fundamental First Amendment goals that are critical to our democracy 
and that outweigh any competing claims of harassment.  
 First, this Note illustrates how the economic boycott has 
increasingly become an effective and popular weapon in the arsenal of 
dissent to counteract the political influence of individuals, large 
corporations, special interest groups, and issue-based organizations 
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that have access to large accumulations of wealth. Then, this Note 
reviews key Court rulings on the economic boycott as a protected First 
Amendment activity and on the establishment of the as-applied 
challenge and the harassment exemption. It also looks at the existing 
tension between the Court’s embrace of compelled disclosure and the 
Court’s protection of anonymous speech. This Note then examines the 
various opinions in Doe v. Reed and their potential to undermine the 
speech protection of economic boycotts in the context of elections. It 
considers how these opinions could have the effect of silencing speech 
and erecting barriers to dissent, and suggests that Major Political 
Players should not have the right to seek the protection from disclosure 
that is intended for politically persecuted groups. Finally, this Note 
argues that economic boycotts advance the core democratic and First 
Amendment values of truth-seeking and dissent and, in so doing, trump 
any disclosure exemptions that Major Political Players may claim. 
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“Acceptance of a right to boycott as a political act must 
entail the rejection of the right to be free of political 
consumer boycotts.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of October 21, 2010, word began to spread that 
American Crossroads, the conservative political action committee 
(PAC) founded by Republican heavyweights Karl Rove and Ed 
Gillespie, had raised $23 million in its first seven months of 
operation leading up to the 2010 midterm elections.2 One of the 
disclosed donors was billionaire Robert Rowling, chief executive 
officer of TRT Holdings, the parent company of Gold’s Gym, and a 
known supporter of anti-gay politicians.3 The filings revealed that 
Mr. Rowling had made contributions totaling more than $2 million 
from his corporate and personal accounts.4 Four days later, on 
October 25, four Gold’s Gym franchises in San Francisco, a city 
known to have a large and politically active gay population, 
announced their decision to sever their twenty-two-year partnership 
with the brand5 after more than two thousand people signed an online 
petition to the head of public relations for Gold’s Gym condemning 
Rowling’s actions and demanding an official response from the 
chain.6 
 
 1. Michael C. Harper, The Consumer’s Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware and Its Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409, 424–25 (1984). The 
article suggests that “boycotts aimed solely at private decisionmaking should share the status of 
other political acts such as electoral voting, contributing money and time to an election or 
referendum campaign.” Id. at 422. 
 2. Jeanne Cummings, Texas Builder Gives Crossroads $7M, POLITICO (Oct. 20, 2010, 
8:53PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1010/43937.html; Lucy Madison, Texas Builder 
Bob Perry Gave $7 Million to American Crossroads, Reports Show, CBS NEWS (Oct. 21, 2010, 
12:39 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20020320-503544.html?tag=content 
Main;contentBody.  
 3. Cummings, supra note 2; Madison, supra note 2. 
 4. Cummings, supra note 2. 
 5. Justin Elliot, Donations to Rove-Tied Group Sparks Gold’s Gym Revolt, SALON.COM 
(Oct. 25, 2010, 2:19 PM), http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2010/10/25/san_ 
francisco_gold_s_american_crossroads. 
 6. Michael Jones, Tell Gold’s Gym: Stop Supporting Anti-gay Politicians, CHANGE.ORG 
(Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.change.org/petitions/tell-golds-gym-stop-supporting-anti-gay-
politicians. 
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Just a few months earlier, Target stores were themselves the 
targets of similar movements after the company disclosed that it had 
donated $150,000 to anti-gay politicians via MN Forward, a 
conservative pro-business PAC based in Minnesota and heavily 
backed by corporate donors.7 Despite a public statement from 
Target’s Chief Executive Officer, Gregg Steinhafel, describing the 
brand’s support for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual 
community as “unwavering,”8 protests and online movements 
surged, urging Target customers to express their criticism and 
disapproval of the donation by boycotting Target stores.9 In a weekly 
report published by Brandweek, a trade magazine on marketing and 
branding, the author noted that Target had lost one-third of its “buzz 
score”10 over the following weeks.11 
The economic boycott, which the U.S. Supreme court has long 
considered protected First Amendment activity,12 has increasingly 
become an effective and popular weapon in the arsenal of dissent to 
counteract the political influence of individuals, large corporations, 
special interest groups, and issue-based organizations with access to 
large accumulations of wealth (“Major Political Players”). 
Individually unable to financially counteract large donations and 
organized political support, consumers and other stakeholders 
 
 7. Brody Mullins & Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to Political 
Contributions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2010, at A2. 
 8. Emily Friedman, Target, Best Buy Angers Gay Customers by Making Contribution to 
GOP Candidate, ABC NEWS (July 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/target-best-buy-
fire-campaign-contributions-minnesota-candidate/story?id=11270194. 
 9. Eliza Newlin Carney, New Spending Rules Mean New Backlash, NAT’L JOURNAL 
(Dec. 16, 2010, 9:55 AM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/rules-of-the-game/new-
spending-rules-mean-new-backlash-20100830?mrefid=site_search. 
 10. Soda Brands Lose Fizz, BRANDWEEK (Sept. 3, 2010), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20100907030059/http://www.brandweek.com/bw/content_display/news-and-features/direct/ 
e3i70ba82a0840c6bbf6596a26035616cbe (explaining that Brandweek calculates a buzz score by 
weighing positive and negative perceptions of a certain brand). 
 11. Id. (reporting that, although the buzz score recovered slightly in the middle of August, 
the score sunk again due to a rash of major newspaper op-eds, blog posts, and publicity 
surrounding televised boycott ads from MoveOn.org, the progressive advocacy group that 
partnered with gay-rights advocates to organize a movement against Target, in which the 
organization collected close to 300,000 petition signatures from outraged customers); see also, 
Carney, supra note 9 (discussing the negative effects that Target has suffered since the 
disclosure). 
 12. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911–12 (1982). See generally 
Harper, supra note 1, at 422 (advocating for a consumer right to boycott guaranteed by the 
Constitution and tracing the derivation of the right). 
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sometimes choose to wield their combined financial clout in the form 
of actual or threatened boycotts to discourage what they consider to 
be unpopular political positions. State and federal laws assist 
consumers and stakeholders with this goal by requiring the 
disclosure of identifying information about campaign donors and 
signers of ballot initiatives and referenda.13 
The recent Supreme Court case of Doe v. Reed14 called into 
question the effectiveness, and potentially the legitimacy, of the 
economic boycott in counteracting the influence of Major Political 
Players in the electoral process. Citing various forms of harassment, 
including fear of economic boycotts, the plaintiffs in Doe, 
Washington state residents, sought an exemption from the state-
mandated disclosure requirements by claiming that it was a violation 
of the First Amendment to compel the disclosure of the identities of 
those who signed the ballot initiative.15 The majority’s holding, 
written by Chief Justice Roberts, was very narrow: compelled 
disclosure in a referendum context was as a general matter 
constitutional.16 However, in dicta, the Court went on to say that 
disclosure of the names of the initiative’s supporters could be subject 
to an as-applied challenge if there was a reasonable probability that 
disclosure would subject the signatories to threats, harassment, or 
reprisals.17 Since this case was a facial challenge, the Court did not 
reach the question of what types of activity might be sufficient to 
successfully override any state interest in compelled disclosure.18 In 
five concurring opinions and one dissent, however, six of the Justices 
weighed in on the subject, with views so disparate that there is no 
clear indication as to how the Court will evaluate such claims in the 
future. This lack of clear direction leaves open the possibility of 
 
 13. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 261 
(2010). This Note will use the term “ballot initiatives” to mean both ballot initiatives and 
referenda. 
 14. 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010). 
 15. Id. at 2815. 
 16. Id. at 2821. 
 17. Id. at 2820–21 (explaining that those resisting disclosure need only show “a reasonable 
probability that the compelled disclosure [of personal information] will subject them to threats, 
harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties” (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam))). 
 18. Id. at 2817. 
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exposing historically protected First Amendment activity to legal 
challenge. 
This Note argues that the Court should not allow Major Political 
Players to use threatened or actual economic boycotts as justification 
for exemptions from disclosure requirements in as-applied 
challenges because economic boycotts advance historically 
recognized First Amendment goals that are critical to our democracy 
and that outweigh any competing claims of harassment. By rejecting 
“economic boycott as harassment” claims, the Court would reaffirm 
the economic boycott as protected First Amendment speech in 
general and, more specifically, as a critical tool for debate and 
dissent in the context of the electoral process. It is not this Note’s 
position that harassment claims are never justified; they may be 
persuasive when they are brought by minority or fringe groups or in 
situations where ordinary individuals are targeted.19 This Note, 
however, focuses on the ramifications of preventing economic 
boycotts from countering large-scale influence on the political 
process. 
Part II reviews key Supreme Court rulings upholding the 
economic boycott as protected First Amendment activity, the 
establishment of the as-applied challenge and the harassment 
exemption, and the existing tension between the Court’s embrace of 
compelled disclosure and its protection of anonymous speech. Part 
III examines the various opinions in Doe v. Reed and their potential 
to undermine the economic boycott as protected speech in the 
context of elections. It considers how these opinions could have the 
effect of silencing speech and erecting barriers to dissent, and 
suggests that Major Political Players should not have the right to 
seek the exemption from disclosure that was originally created for 
politically persecuted groups. Part IV analyzes how economic 
boycotts advance the core democratic and First Amendment values 
of truth-seeking and dissent and, in so doing, how they trump any 
disclosure exemptions that Major Political Players may claim. 
 
 19. See infra Part IV.B. 
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II.  THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE  
ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AND  
THE HARASSMENT EXCEPTION 
Over the last fifty years, the debate over compelled disclosure of 
names, addresses, donation amounts, and other personal information 
related to political donations or ballot initiatives has garnered 
impassioned advocates and equally strong opponents. Federal 
campaign-finance law requires such disclosure, and most states 
authorize such disclosure in connection with government records and 
documents.20 The public policy behind disclosure has remained the 
same over time—it is intended to curb the influence of money and 
special interests in elections while cleansing potentially corrupt 
political practices and providing information to the electorate.21 
Dating back to the 1890s, disclosure has been used not only for 
monitoring the role money plays in elections, but also for ensuring 
transparency in government22 and helping voters to make informed 
decisions.23 
Those in support of disclosure claim that the resulting 
transparency adds to the democratic marketplace by allowing the free 
and open exchange of ideas and provides a deterrent to excessively 
large campaign contributions and undue influence.24 Opponents, 
however, argue that compelled disclosure is an unconstitutional 
burden since it not only infringes on one’s right to privacy and 
results in the chilling of speech, but it also triggers acts of retaliation 
or harassment by those of different ideological or political 
persuasions.25 Since both sides of the debate have legitimate claims 
to constitutional safeguards, the Court has increasingly had to 
consider the question of which claim should be given more weight in 
a particular case. Various as-applied challenges to disclosure laws 
over the past sixty years reflect the balancing of the stated 
 
 20. Mayer, supra note 13, at 261–62. 
 21. Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 273 (2010). 
 22. Id. at 274. 
 23. Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 75, 82 (2010). 
 24. Id. at 101; see Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, in THE NEW 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 123, 136 (2005). 
 25. Mayer, supra note 13, at 271–73. 
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government interests behind disclosure with the First Amendment 
protections at stake.26 
A.  The Economic Boycott as  
Protected First Amendment Activity 
As early as 1940, in Thornhill v. Alabama,27 the Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of a statute broadly prohibiting 
picketing in a labor dispute. In that case, the plaintiff was picketing 
against an ex-employer and was convicted of violating a state code.28 
The code prohibited loitering and picketing around the premises of a 
business for the express purpose of advising current and prospective 
customers of the business’s practices and affiliations and 
encouraging those customers not to patronize the business.29 The 
plaintiff charged that the statute deprived him of his right to free 
speech, assembly, and right to petition for redress.30 The Court 
agreed and held that the statute was unconstitutional on its face 
because it was a “sweeping proscription of the freedom of 
discussion”31 that prohibited “every practicable, effective means . . . 
[to] enlighten the public . . . with respect to a matter which is of 
public concern.”32 The Court found that safeguarding such means 
was essential, even if the means risked injury to a business 
establishment.33 
Several decades later, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,34 the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of boycotts as retaliation against 
businesses that engaged in race discrimination.35 In 1966, a 
Mississippi branch of the NAACP participated in a seven-year 
boycott of white merchants in the area, demanding racial equality, 
justice, and integration.36 The defendants stood in front of stores and 
encouraged African American customers not to patronize the 
 
 26. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 27. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
 28. Id. at 91–92. 
 29. Id. at 99. 
 30. Id. at 92–93. 
 31. Id. at 105. 
 32. Id. at 104. 
 33. Id. at 104–05. 
 34. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 35. Id. at 911–12. 
 36. Id. at 889, 893, 907. 
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businesses.37 The Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld a chancery 
court’s ruling that the boycott was unlawful according to the 
common law and confirmed that the defendants were jointly and 
severally liable for any business losses over the period.38 The Court 
reversed the state court’s holding.39 Drawing on its decision in 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson40 (Patterson) discussed below, 
the Court recognized the “importance of freedom of association in 
guaranteeing the right of people to make their voices heard on public 
issues.”41 Following this precedent, the Court held that the boycott in 
Claiborne Hardware clearly involved First Amendment activity and 
thus deserved protection.42 
B.  Precursors to the As-Applied Challenge:  
The Rights to Private Association  
and Anonymous Speech 
In 1958, at the height of the civil rights movement, the Supreme 
Court decided the landmark case of Patterson. The Court addressed 
whether the state of Alabama could constitutionally compel the 
NAACP to supply the state with a complete list of its members’ and 
agents’ names and addresses to determine if the NAACP complied 
with Alabama business law.43 The civil rights group claimed that it 
was constitutionally protected from turning over the list on the 
grounds that compelling the identification of its members would 
infringe on their freedom of association under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 The Court unanimously 
decided in favor of the plaintiffs by upholding the right of the 
members to “pursue their lawful private interests privately.”45 
Uncontroverted evidence of extreme intimidation and violence 
against NAACP members persuaded the Court to rule in the 
plaintiffs’ favor. The NAACP detailed numerous instances in which 
 
 37. See id. at 889–90, 893. 
 38. Id. at 894–95. 
 39. Id. at 934. 
 40. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 41. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 908 (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of 
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981)). 
 42. Id. at 911–12. 
 43. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 451. 
 44. Id. at 460. 
 45. Id. at 466. 
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members faced “economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of 
physical coercion, and . . . public hostility.”46 Acknowledging the 
organization’s “dissident beliefs,”47 the Court reasoned that 
subjecting the NAACP to compelled disclosure would threaten the 
“effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, 
particularly controversial ones, [which] is undeniably enhanced by 
group association.”48 It concluded that these disclosure requirements 
did not have a “substantial” bearing on the state’s interests and 
therefore were not justified.49 
The Court reinforced this holding two years later in Bates v. City 
of Little Rock50 and Talley v. California.51 In Bates, the Court 
confronted a situation in Arkansas that was almost identical to the 
one in Alabama: amid a racially charged climate, county 
administrators demanded that the Little Rock branch of the NAACP 
produce lists of its members in compliance with the local tax 
ordinance.52 The NAACP refused, asserting the right of its members 
to associate anonymously, and the Court again unanimously upheld 
this right based on “substantial uncontroverted evidence . . . [of] 
harassment and threats of bodily harm” to the members.53 This time 
the Court invoked the First Amendment right of peaceable assembly, 
a notion that the Court did not rely on in Patterson, when it stated 
that “compulsory disclosure of the membership lists . . . would work 
a significant interference with the freedom of association of their 
members.”54 
In Talley, an individual plaintiff was charged with violating a 
Los Angeles city ordinance that broadly restricted the distribution of 
any handbill that did not identify the name and address of the 
individual who had created or circulated it.55 Talley, on behalf of the 
National Consumers Mobilization, distributed pamphlets urging 
 
 46. Id. at 462. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 460. 
 49. Id. at 464–65. 
 50. 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960). 
 51. 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). 
 52. Bates, 361 U.S. at 517–18. 
 53. Id. at 523–24. 
 54. Id. at 522–23. 
 55. Talley, 362 U.S. at 60–61. 
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consumers to boycott businesses that did not offer equal opportunity 
employment to “Negroes, Mexicans, and Orientals.”56 Although the 
ordinance did not specifically target a civil rights group such as the 
NAACP, Talley’s pamphlet did address civil rights issues.57 The 
Supreme Court relied on both Patterson and Bates in voiding the 
ordinance, reasoning that the “identification and fear of reprisal 
might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of 
importance.”58 Recognizing the fundamental role that anonymous 
literature had played in “criticiz[ing] oppressive practices and laws,” 
the Court held that validating the ordinance would abridge the 
plaintiff’s freedoms of speech and the press.59 
C.  Protecting Minor Parties:  
Buckley’s Reasonable Probability Test  
and the Socialist Workers’ Party Exception 
The Court relied heavily on its decisions in civil rights cases 
from the previous decade when, in the 1976 case Buckley v. Valeo,60 
it confronted the issue of compelled disclosure in the realm of 
campaign finance law.61 Although the Court in Buckley primarily 
addressed the constitutionality of spending ceilings for political 
contributions, its decision was also instrumental in establishing the 
tenets of disclosure jurisprudence that courts consistently defer to 
today.62 The Court in this case upheld the Federal Election Campaign 
Act (FECA) disclosure requirements,63 while it acknowledged that 
 
 56. Id. at 61. 
 57. See id. at 61, 64–65. 
 58. Id. at 65. 
 59. Id. at 64–65. 
 60. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 61. Id. at 25, 64, 71. “There could well be a case, similar to those before the Court in 
[Patterson] and Bates, where the threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights is so serious 
and the state interest furthered by disclosure so insubstantial that the Act’s requirements cannot 
be constitutionally applied.” Id. at 71. 
 62. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898, 908 (2010); Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 
2811, 2818 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 120–22 (2003); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995). 
 63. The FECA required political committees, parties, and candidates to register with the 
FEC and disclose their contributors and the size of the contributions. 2 U.S.C. § 432 (2006). It 
also compelled groups to disclose the recipient and size of the expenditure. Id. § 433. An 
expenditure is defined as “any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of 
money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for 
Federal office.” Id. § 431(9)(A). 
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there is a critical exception when a court might consider disclosure to 
be unconstitutional.64 Drawing on Patterson and Bates,65 the Court 
suggested that minor political parties and their contributors that 
could prove a “reasonable probability that the compelled 
disclosure . . . will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals 
from either Government officials or private parties”66 could gain an 
exemption from disclosure. It characterized “minor parties” as those 
with a small political base whose unconventional or unpopular ideas 
had “little or no chance of winning.”67 The Court reasoned that minor 
parties were unlikely to have a firm financial base; therefore, 
compelled disclosure could threaten their very survival.68 Although 
the Court did not carve out an absolute exemption for all minor 
parties, it set forth the burden of proof that a party must overcome to 
bring a successful as-applied challenge on such grounds.69 
Six years after Buckley, the Court applied that test for the first 
time in Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee70 
(Socialist Workers’ Party), in which members of the Socialist 
Workers’ Party (SWP) in Ohio challenged the constitutionality of the 
state’s campaign-finance reporting and disclosure laws.71 Based on 
evidence of the SWP’s sixty-person membership, mediocre success 
at the polls, and miniscule campaign contributions,72 the Court 
characterized the SWP as a minor party.73 Like the NAACP, the 
SWP had presented a robust factual record that showed that 
government officials and private citizens had harassed members; the 
harassment included destruction of property, the firing of gunshots at 
an SWP headquarters, threatening phone calls, hate mail, and loss of 
employment.74 The Court found that the harassment was “ingrained 
 
 64. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 71–72, 74. 
 67. See id. at 68–72. For instance, the Court considered independent and new political 
parties to be “minor parties.” See id. at 87–88. 
 68. Id. at 71. 
 69. Id. at 74. 
 70. 459 U.S. 87 (1982). 
 71. Id. at 89. 
 72. Id. at 88–89. 
 73. Id. at 98–102. 
 74. Id. at 98–100. Twenty-two of the sixty SWP members had been fired from their jobs 
based on their affiliation with the SWP. Citing the district court decision, the Court recognized 
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and likely to continue.”75 Similar to the way it viewed the NAACP, 
the Court viewed the SWP as a historically persecuted and 
vulnerable group.76 Notwithstanding the Court’s otherwise strong 
affirmation of disclosure requirements, the Court upheld the 
challenge, maintaining that disclosure would infringe the First 
Amendment rights of both members and supporters of the SWP.77 
D.  The Conflict Between Anonymous Speech and  
Compelled Disclosure in the Electoral Process 
Thirty-five years after its decision in Talley, the Court 
reexamined the issue of anonymous speech in McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Commission.78 The case centered on Margaret McIntyre, 
who authored leaflets expressing her opposition to a proposed 
school-tax referendum and publicly distributed them at a public 
meeting and on car windshields in a school parking lot.79 McIntyre’s 
name appeared on some pamphlets, but on others, she credited the 
bills to “Concerned Parents and Tax Payers,” a fictitious 
organization.80 McIntyre was subsequently charged with violating an 
Ohio election statute that forbade anonymous publication designed to 
promote or defeat a ballot issue, and she was fined $100. 81 The Court 
struck down Ohio’s identification requirement and reaffirmed the 
notion that the First Amendment protects a person’s decision to 
remain anonymous.82 The Court held that the “the interest in having 
anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably 
outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition 
of entry.”83 The Court characterized McIntyre’s advocacy as 
“[u]rgent, important, and effective speech,” which deserved even 
more protection since it occurred during a controversial referendum 
 
that “private hostility and harassment toward SWP members make it difficult for them to 
maintain employment.” Id. at 99. 
 75. Id. at 101. 
 76. See id. at 99–101. 
 77. Id. at 101–02. 
 78. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 79. Id. at 337. 
 80. Id. at 337, 341–42. 
 81. Id. at 338–39 & n.3. 
 82. Id. at 357. 
 83. Id. at 342. 
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vote.84 While the Court in Buckley emphasized the informational 
value that disclosure served in helping voters evaluate candidates,85 
the Court in McIntyre concluded that knowing the name and address 
of a private citizen added little to the “ability to evaluate the 
document’s message.”86 
However, in 2009, a California federal district court decided a 
controversial case that represented a shift away from protecting 
anonymity and toward compelling disclosure; this foreshadowed 
many of the issues that the Supreme Court would address only a year 
later in Doe v. Reed. The district court case, ProtectMarriage.com v. 
Bowen87 dealt with the backlash that supporters of Proposition 8, an 
anti-gay marriage ballot initiative, received.88 Proposition 8 sought to 
amend the state constitution to define and recognize marriage as a 
union between a man and a woman.89 The plaintiffs, who comprised 
a number of ballot committees that were formed to support the 
passage of Proposition 8, challenged the constitutionality of 
California’s Political Reform Act of 1974.90 The Act required the 
plaintiffs to disclose personal information about their donors, 
including the donors’ names, street addresses, occupations, 
employers, and amounts contributed.91 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin 
a second round of disclosure based on the Buckley/SWP exemption,92 
maintaining that they had sustained extensive economic injury from 
boycotts.93 
 
 84. Id. at 347. 
 85. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81 (1976) (per curiam). 
 86. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348–49. 
 87. 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 88. See infra notes 249–51 and accompanying text. 
 89. See ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1199. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Although the Court in Buckley originally articulated the harassment exemption, this Note 
will refer to the exemption as the “Buckley/SWP exemption.” While Buckley is best known for its 
holding regarding the constitutionality of independent expenditures and contributions, the holding 
in Socialist Workers’ Party was limited to whether the SWP was entitled to an exemption from 
disclosure. Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982); Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 12–14. 
 93. See ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1200–04. The author of one anonymous 
declaration that was submitted to the court recounted how his business had been the target of 
numerous boycotts and pickets, several of which were orchestrated through Facebook; how 
negative reviews of his store had been posted on Yelp.com; and how patrons had visited his place 
of business to express their disapproval of his position. Id. at 1201. Another donor complained of 
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Judge England rebuked the plaintiffs for relying on the 
Buckley/SWP exemption to justify an exemption from disclosure for 
an anti-gay movement that enjoyed widespread popular support.94 He 
noted that the plaintiffs’  ballot initiative was “successful at the polls, 
[had] evidenced a very minimal effect on [the plaintiffs’] ability to 
sustain their movement, and [was] unable to produce evidence of 
pervasive animosity even remotely reaching the level of that present 
in” Socialist Workers’ Party.95 He concluded that the supporters of 
Proposition 8, as “backers of a historically non-controversial 
belief,”96 could not be considered a minor party for purposes of the 
as-applied challenge.97 He further declared that the threats and 
harassment that the plaintiffs suffered did not compare to the violent, 
ongoing, and pervasive harassment that was present in Patterson and 
Socialist Workers’ Party.98 In ProtectMarriage.com, the harassment 
was comparatively benign, occurred over the course of only a few 
months, and targeted only a small segment of supporters.99 The court 
also noted that numerous acts about which the plaintiffs were 
complaining, including economic boycotts, were fundamental, 
lawful, and historical means of voicing dissent.100 The judge further 
chastised, 
Plaintiffs’ exemption argument appears to be premised, in 
large part, on the concept that individuals should be free 
from even legal consequences of their speech. That is 
simply not the nature of their right. Just as contributors to 
Proposition 8 are free to speak in favor of the initiative, so 
 
receiving an e-mail threatening damage to his company’s reputation based on his support of 
Proposition 8. Id. at 1202. 
 94. Id. at 1215–16. 
 95. Id. at 1214. 
 96. Id. at 1219. 
 97. Id. at 1215–16 (explaining that the plaintiffs were part of a larger group of proponents of 
the initiative that garnered nearly $30 million in funding and had convinced more than seven 
million California residents to vote in favor of Proposition 8 on Election Day). 
 98. Id. at 1216. 
 99. Id. at 1214 (“[T]his Court must now evaluate whether Brown can properly be applied to 
groups that were successful at the polls, that have evidenced a very minimal effect on their ability 
to sustain their movement, and that are unable to produce evidence of pervasive animosity even 
remotely reaching the level of that present in Brown.”). 
 100. Id. at 1218 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) and NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)). 
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are opponents free to express their disagreement through 
proper legal means.101 
III.  DOE V. REED:  
THE THREAT TO THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT  
AS PROTECTED FIRST AMENDMENT ACTIVITY  
IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
Over the last thirty-five years, courts have issued seemingly 
conflicting opinions—some that embrace compelled disclosure and 
others that protect anonymity in the electoral process.102 Furthermore, 
courts have not reconsidered or clarified the harassment exemption 
by applying the as-applied challenge or by crafting of specific 
rules.103 To date, Socialist Workers’ Party remains the only case in 
which the Supreme Court has granted an as-applied challenge that 
was based on claims of harassment.104 
In June 2010, the Supreme Court decided Doe v. Reed,105 a 
decision that observers thought might bring some clarity to a field 
filled with uncertainty.106 In this case, the Court, like the federal 
district court in ProtectMarriage.com, moved away from protecting 
anonymity and held that the compelled disclosure of signatory 
information on referendum petitions was constitutional.107 However, 
although Justice Stevens began his concurrence by observing that 
 
 101. Id. at 1217. 
 102. See supra Part II.D. 
 103. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing 
Money in Politics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV 1057, 1100 
(2011). 
 104. Id. at 1096. 
 105. 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010). 
 106. See also Richard L. Hasen, Show Me the Donors, SLATE (Oct. 14, 2010, 4:06 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2271187/ (examining the current state of campaign finance disclosure 
and its effectiveness); Dale A. Oesterle, Doe v. Reed a Disappointment on Several Fronts, 
ELECTION L. @ MORITZ (July 2, 2010), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/ 
index.php?ID=7425 (criticizing the Doe decision for several reasons, including that it failed to 
answer the critical question regarding the challenge to the specific referendum at issue); see 
generally Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens 
United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983 (2011) (examining the results of the 
Citizens United and Doe decisions on disclosure law going forward). 
 107. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2815. 
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“[t]his is not a hard case,”108 the decision, with five concurrences and 
one dissenting opinion, raised more questions than it answered.109 
A.  The Decision in Doe v. Reed:  
A Facial Challenge 
Doe v. Reed centered on Washington State Referendum-71  
(“R-71”), which sought to revoke the state’s then-recent extension of 
rights and benefits to same-sex couples.110 In order to verify that a 
sufficient number of registered voters wished to see the measure 
placed on the ballot, the state required proponents to turn over the 
signed petitions that included the names and addresses of the 
signatories to the secretary of state, who deemed the petitions public 
records under Washington’s Public Records Act (PRA) and thus 
subject to the state’s disclosure requirements.111 Soon after the 
proponents submitted the R-71 petitions to the secretary of state’s 
office, demands for copies began to trickle in.112 WhoSigned.org and 
KnowThyNeighbor.org, two of the groups seeking access to the 
records, planned on posting the signatories’ names and addresses in a 
searchable online database.113 In response, Protect Marriage 
Washington, the organization sponsoring R-71, filed a complaint in 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington to 
enjoin the secretary of state from publicly releasing the names and 
addresses of the signers.114 
 
 108. Id. at 2829 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 109. Adam Liptak, Secrecy Rejected on Ballot Petitions, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2010, at A22. 
(“The near-unanimity of the decision masked a deep division on a more focused question that the 
justices left for another day: Are there good reasons to protect the identities of people who signed 
petitions concerning a measure opposing gay rights and say they fear harassment and retaliation 
should their names be posted on the Internet?”); Eliza Newlin Carney, Campaign Finance Fight 
Moves to Disclosure, NAT’L JOURNAL (Dec. 18, 2010, 9:22 PM), http://nationaljournal.com/ 
columns/rules-of-the-game/campaign-finance-fight-moves-to-disclosure-20100503 (“The 
intensifying debate has raised questions that to go the heart of American political engagement. 
How much secrecy is too much? How much transparency treads on privacy and free speech?”); 
see Daniel Schuman, The Ticking Time Bomb in the Supreme Court’s Doe v. Reed Opinion, 
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (June 25, 2010, 8:02 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2010/06/ 
25/the-ticking-time-bomb-in-the-supreme-court%E2%80%99s-doe-v-reed-opinion/. 
 110. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2816. 
 111. Id. at 2815–16. 
 112. Id. at 2816 (explaining that Protect Marriage Washington submitted 137,000 signatures 
on July 25, 2009, and by August 20, 2009, the secretary of state had already received several 
requests for copies). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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The plaintiffs asserted two claims. The first, a broad facial 
challenge, alleged that the application of Washington’s PRA to 
referendum petitions in general violated the First Amendment.115 The 
second, as-applied claim asserted that the application of the PRA in 
the specific case of R-71 was unconstitutional based on Buckley.116 
The plaintiffs alleged that there would be a reasonable probability 
that the disclosure would subject R-71 signers to threats, harassment, 
and reprisals.117 Because the district court found for the plaintiffs on 
the first claim, it never reached the second claim; therefore, only the 
broad facial challenge to R-71 reached the Ninth Circuit and the 
claim regarding the as-applied exemption was never heard.118 
The State of Washington offered two compelling state interests 
justifying disclosure: first, to preserve the integrity of its referendum 
process by combating fraud and fostering government transparency 
and accountability; and second, to provide the electorate with 
information as to who was supporting the petition so that voters 
could make an informed decision.119 The plaintiffs argued that 
publishing the signers personal information online would 
“effectively become a blueprint for harassment and intimidation.”120 
But the plaintiffs’ argument was only based on specific harm that 
disclosure would impose on R-71 signers. They did not offer 
sufficient evidence to convince a majority of the Justices that 
disclosure would also impose severe burdens on signers of typical 
ballot initiatives that, unlike R-71, are usually not controversial.121 
Determining that the anticorruption interest was sufficient to justify 
disclosure under the PRA, the Court did not address the question of 
the informational interest.122 
In an 8–1 majority opinion, which only took up a fifth of the 
entire length of the Court’s decision,123 Chief Justice Roberts 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 2816, 2820–21. 
 119. Id. at 2819. 
 120. Id. at 2820. 
 121. Id. at 2821 (referring to referenda relating to taxes, revenue, or the budget as “typical”). 
 122. Id. at 2819 (Chief Justice Roberts stated, “[W]e need not, and do not, address the State’s 
‘informational’ interest.”). 
 123. The majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts totaled seven pages. The other six 
opinions totaled twenty-six pages in length. 
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acknowledged that individuals express some form of a political view 
when they commit their names to a petition for a ballot initiative.124 
He reasoned that since such activity is expressive, petition signing 
constituted political speech protected by the First Amendment.125 
Nonetheless, the Court rejected the facial challenge, upholding the 
disclosure requirement of the PRA in the context of ballot initiatives 
in general, pointing out that “the PRA is not a prohibition on speech, 
but instead a disclosure requirement . . . [which] may burden the 
ability to speak, but . . . do[es] not prevent anyone from speaking.”126 
As Buckley allowed,127 the plaintiffs in Doe cited examples in 
their briefs from the history of Proposition 8 in California, to argue 
that they would be subject to harassment in the form of economic 
boycotts if their names were disclosed.128 Since the narrower claim 
that R-71 signatories were likely to be targets of harassment was not 
before the Court, the Court did not have to decide what precise 
activity would constitute sufficient grounds to justify an as-applied 
challenge to disclosure. However, the majority noted that the 
plaintiffs’ right to bring such a challenge based on the Buckley/SWP 
exemption remained available, thus opening the door for the other 
Justices to opine on the merits of that challenge.129 
B.  The Various Opinions in Doe:  
Perspectives on the As-Applied Challenge 
Despite the fact that the plaintiffs cited the threat of economic 
boycotts in Doe as one type of harassment giving rise to their claim 
 
 124. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2818. 
 125. Id. This reasoning was in tension with the reasoning in earlier Supreme Court decisions 
that rejected ballot voting as a form of individual expression. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New 
Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997) (holding that Minnesota’s anti-fusion laws prohibiting candidates 
from appearing on a ballot as a candidate of more than one political party did not violate the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430, 437–38 (1992).  
 126. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2818 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (“New parties that have no history upon which 
to draw may be able to offer evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or 
organizations holding similar views.”). 
 128. Petitioners’ Brief at 11, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-559), 2010 WL 
711186, at *11 (“Boycotts were threatened: ‘We shall boycott the businesses of EVERYONE 
who signs your odious, bigoted petition.’”). 
 129. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2821 (“[W]e note—as we have in other election law disclosure 
cases—that upholding the law against a broad-based challenge does not foreclose a litigant’s 
success in a narrower one.”). 
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for exemption from disclosure, only Justice Alito addressed this 
claim directly. The divergent views of the remaining Justices as to 
what type of activity could constitute harassment, and what type of 
plaintiff might be eligible to bring such claims, have sent conflicting 
and confusing signals regarding whether such boycotts will remain 
protected First Amendment activity. During oral arguments in Doe, 
Justice Kennedy asked both sides why, if Claiborne Hardware 
upheld a boycott as protected First Amendment activity, that case 
could be used as justification for granting an as-applied exemption.130 
The plaintiffs’ attorney offered no response to this direct question;131 
not one of the Justices in any of the seven opinions comprising this 
case addressed the conflict inherent in these two positions. 
1.  The Economic Boycott as Harassment:  
The Threat to “Uninhibited,  
Robust, and Wide-Open” Debate132 
None of the Justices made any mention whatsoever of the effect 
that disclosure exemptions would have on stifling historically 
protected speech. However, the views of some of the Justices are 
instructive as to how they would evaluate future claims of 
harassment and, by extension, whether they would consider 
economic boycotts as harassment that results in the suppression of 
speech in the marketplace. 
Justices Alito and Thomas were strongly in favor of granting 
exemptions based on fear of harassment, albeit on vastly different 
grounds. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion was the most specific on 
this point. He noted that the plaintiffs’ reliance on evidence of 
boycotts and blacklists of businesses that similarly situated plaintiffs 
faced in the Proposition 8 controversy in California provided a strong 
case for an exemption, stating, “[I]f the evidence relating to 
Proposition 8 is not sufficient to obtain an as-applied exemption in 
this case, one may wonder whether that vehicle provides any 
meaningful protection for the First Amendment rights of persons 
 
 130. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, 38–39, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 
09-559), 2010 WL 1789917, *13–14, *38–39. 
 131. Id. 
 132. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (capitalization altered from 
original). 
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who circulate and sign referendum and initiative petitions.”133 
Although he did not address boycotts directly, Justice Thomas went 
even further in his dissent, making the case that subjecting ballot 
initiatives to disclosure is always unconstitutional.134 In one of 
several rationales, Justice Thomas relied on Patterson and Socialist 
Workers’ Party to point out that signing a referendum petition is an 
act of political association that  the First Amendment protects.135 
On the polar opposite side of the issue was Justice Scalia, who 
doubted that petition signing constituted an act that “fits within 
freedom of speech at all” but contended, for the sake of argument, 
that the First Amendment would not prohibit disclosure.136 Making a 
strong case for allowing differing opinions into the marketplace, he 
admonished that democracy requires “civic courage”137: 
[H]arsh criticism, short of unlawful action, is a price our 
people have traditionally been willing to pay for self-
governance. Requiring people to stand up in public for their 
political acts fosters civic courage, without which 
democracy is doomed. For my part, I do not look forward to 
a society which, thanks to the Supreme Court, campaigns 
anonymously and even exercises the direct democracy of 
initiative and referendum hidden from public scrutiny and 
protected from the accountability of criticism. This does not 
resemble the Home of the Brave.138 
Justice Sotomayor also favored disclosure in this case; in a 
concurring opinion that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined, she 
imagined a very high bar for plaintiffs who seek to qualify for an as-
applied exemption.139 Citing Patterson, she suggested that, barring 
application of a facially neutral petition in a discriminatory manner, 
exemptions should be limited to “the rare circumstance in which 
disclosure poses a reasonable probability of serious and widespread 
harassment that the State is unwilling or unable to control.”140 In a 
 
 133. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2823–24 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 134. Id. at 2837 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 2839. 
 136. Id. at 2832 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137. Id. at 2837. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 2829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 140. Id. (emphasis added). 
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separate concurrence, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, 
noted that he would “demand strong evidence before concluding that 
an indirect and speculative chain of events imposes a substantial 
burden on speech.”141 Like Justice Sotomayor, he also suggested a 
stringent burden of proof: absent “rare” situations like those in Bates 
or Socialist Workers’ Party, where the individual threat level is not 
so high but disclosure requirements would threaten the ability of a 
group to place a matter on the ballot, “a significant threat of 
harassment . . . that cannot be mitigated by law enforcement 
measures” should be required to succeed in an as-applied 
challenge.142 
The Court now appears to be divided on the issue of whether 
exemptions from disclosure are merited based on fear of economic 
boycotts. Although the plaintiffs in Doe are distinguishable from 
companies like Target and Gold’s Gym (who may seek such 
exemptions), both Justices Alito and Thomas appear to be open to 
granting exemptions to even Major Political Players. Justice Alito, 
relying on Buckley’s more relaxed “reasonable probability” standard, 
was prepared to accept the plaintiffs’ speculative evidence of 
harassment.143 Justice Thomas, in noting the need to protect privacy 
of association, observed that “signing a referendum petition is a 
paradigmatic example of ‘the practice of persons sharing common 
views banding together to achieve a common end,’”144 and he pointed 
out that a referendum supported by only one person would be of no 
effect. However, he neglected to address the fact that the same 
rationale can just as easily be applied to the need of individuals to 
band together in boycotts to effectuate their goals. 
On the other hand, one could extrapolate from the opinions of 
Justices Scalia, Sotomayor, and Stevens that they, along with Justice 
Ginsburg, would be hard-pressed to grant exemptions based on fear 
of economic boycotts but instead would favor allowing this speech to 
enter the marketplace.145 Although neither Justice Sotomayor nor 
 
 141. Id. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. at 2823–24 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 144. Id. at 2839 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of 
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981)). 
 145. See id. at 2836–37 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I 
find it difficult to see how any incremental disincentive to sign a petition would tip the 
constitutional balance.”). 
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Justice Stevens addressed what form of activity would constitute 
“serious and widespread harassment” or a “significant threat” of 
harassment, their reliance on Patterson and Socialist Workers’ Party 
suggests that they likely envisioned applying the exemption only to 
persecuted social groups or fringe political parties that suffered 
extreme harassment over extended periods of time.146 Each of these 
four Justices seemed intent on discouraging any regulation of speech, 
except in the narrowest of circumstances.147 As Justice Sotomayor 
acknowledged, “[O]penness in the democratic process is of ‘critical 
importance.’”148 
2.  The Threat to an Informed Electorate:  
Strengthening Legal Barriers to Dissent 
If the Court deems the threat of an economic boycott to be 
sufficient grounds for an as-applied exemption from disclosure 
requirements, it risks undermining the value of an economic boycott 
as an expression of dissent. Although the Justices in Doe encountered 
facts that were almost identical to those of the Proposition 8 
controversy in California, none of the Justices voiced the clear 
sentiment that Judge England expressed in ProtectMarriage.com. He 
explained: 
[T]he Court simply cannot ignore the fact that numerous of 
the acts about which Plaintiffs’ complain are mechanisms 
relied upon, both historically and lawfully, to voice dissent. 
The decision and ability to patronize a particular 
establishment or business is an inherent right of the 
American people, and the public has historically remained 
free to choose where to, or not to, allocate its economic 
resources. As such, individuals have repeatedly resorted to 
boycotts as a form of civil protest intended to convey a 
powerful message.149 
 
 146. See id. at 2829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Case-specific relief may be available . . . in 
the rare circumstance in which disclosure poses a reasonable probability of serious and 
widespread harassment . . . .”); id. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 147. See id. at 2821 (majority opinion); id. at 2823 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2829 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 148. Id. at 2828 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 
495 (1975)). 
 149. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
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These “powerful messages” that protest the behavior of Major 
Political Players are in danger of being stifled if economic boycotts 
are deemed to be harassment. 
WhoSigned.org explained that it requested disclosure of the  
R-71 signatures because it wanted to engage the signers in 
“uncomfortable” conversations about the issue of gay marriage 
addressed in the ballot initiative150 (i.e., to engage in debate on the 
subject). At least one scholar has observed that, in his majority 
opinion in Doe, Chief Justice Roberts left the door open for an as-
applied challenge based on the reasonable probability of harassment 
resulting from the “controversialness [sic] of the issue”151 rather than 
from the vulnerability of a group, as was the case in Patterson and 
Socialist Workers’ Party. Examining the various opinions in Doe 
reveals some disagreement on the topic of controversial ballot 
initiatives. However, while one may argue that controversial 
petitions inherently are more likely to lead to harassment, it is 
inarguable that they are also more likely to benefit from debate, an 
exercise that would be stifled by granting such exemptions from 
disclosure. 
In disallowing the plaintiffs’ facial challenge, Chief Justice 
Roberts alluded to a distinction that could be made between 
protection from disclosure in “typical” referendum petitions, such as 
those involving “tax policy, revenue, budget, or other state law 
issues[,]” and in “controversial” ones such as the R-71 petition.152 He 
 
 150. Press Release, KnowThyNeighbor.org, KnowThyNeighbor.org Partners with 
WhoSigned.org in Washington State (June 1, 2009), available at http://knowthy 
neighbor.blogs.com/home/2009/06/knowthyneighbororg-partners-with-whosignedorg-in-
washington-state.html (“WhoSigned.org expects Washington State’s pro-equality citizens to use 
its online tools to find the names of people they know, and talk with those people about the real 
world impact of their actions. ‘Conversations like these can be uncomfortable, but they are 
necessary for people to understand how vital these basic rights and protections are for gay and 
straight families alike.’”); see also Press Release, KnowThyNeighbor.org, Names of Arkansas 
Anti-Gay Petition Signers Posted Online (Apr. 28, 2009), available at 
http://knowthyneighbor.blogs.com/home/2009/04/press-release-names-of-arkansas-antigay-
petition-signers-posted-online.html (announcing the release of signatures on similar petitions in 
Arkansas and stating that KnowThyNeighbor.org “expect[ed] that many petition signers will be 
confronted about their actions as their names are discovered on the website by family members, 
friends, coworkers, customers, and acquaintances”). 
 151. Monica Youn, Remarks at the Brennan Center for Justice Accountability After Citizens 
United—Panel Three (Apr. 29, 2011), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/pages/ 
accountability_after_citizens_united_panel_three_questions_and_answers_tran (transcript and 
video). 
 152. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2821. 
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observed that burdens imposed by typical petitions are not “remotely 
like the burdens plaintiffs fear in this case.”153 Justice Alito echoed 
this observation, noting that the plaintiffs had provided no evidence 
that disclosure would discourage signers of typical petitions from 
participating in the electoral process.154 Justice Sotomayor disagreed 
with Justice Roberts’s distinction and instead argued that a state’s 
interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process remained 
undiminished despite the fact that the referendum involved a 
controversial subject and the fact that signers feared harassment from 
non-state actors.155 Although Justice Thomas also disagreed with the 
Chief Justice’s distinction, he drew the opposite conclusion that the 
combination of Washington’s disclosure laws and the difficulty in 
predicting which ballot initiatives would prove controversial was a 
recipe for the unconstitutional chilling of speech.156 
It is also worth noting that in examining Washington’s 
justification for the PRA, Chief Justice Roberts was able to avoid 
discussion of the state’s interest in having an informed electorate 
because he relied on the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of 
elections.157 The other Justices exhibited conflicting points of view 
on the state’s informational interest. Justice Sotomayor referred to 
the need for disclosure to enable the electorate to make informed 
decisions.158 On the other hand, Justice Alito was openly hostile to 
the value of informing voters about who financed a referendum and 
how to contact the referendum’s supporters, given that those 
supporters feared retaliation and recrimination.159 He suggested that 
disclosing this information would constitute “a means of facilitating 
harassment that impermissibly chills the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.”160 Justice Thomas asserted that “[p]eople are 
intelligent enough to evaluate the merits of a referendum without 
knowing who supported it.”161 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 2822 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 155. Id. at 2829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 156. Id. at 2846 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 2819–20 (majority opinion). 
 158. Id. at 2828 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 159. Id. at 2824–25 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 160. Id. at 2825. 
 161. Id. at 2843 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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One may argue that the members of KnowThyNeighbor.org and 
WhoSigned.org were a bit disingenuous in stating that their objective 
in seeking disclosure was to engage the signers of R-71 in 
“uncomfortable conversations.” It may be that their request for 
disclosure was really prompted by a need for information necessary 
to implement organized responses to the signatories, including 
boycotts. Undoubtedly, the Internet has fundamentally changed the 
ease with which we can access information about our opponents and 
physically confront them.162 However, as much as one has the right to 
make political donations or sign one’s name to a petition without 
being harassed via illegal activities, one also has the right to express 
opposition to another’s political view through constitutionally 
protected speech such as economic boycotts. 
3.  The Co-option of the Minor Party  
Interest by Major Political Players 
The plaintiffs in Doe relied on the Buckley/SWP exemption that 
the Court originally developed for minor parties to justify the 
plaintiffs’ claim for an exemption from disclosure,163 despite the 
world of difference between being an African American in the 1950s 
and a heterosexual adult representing a mainstream view in 2010. 
However, the Court ignored the distinction by allowing the 
Buckley/SWP exemption to guide any future as-applied challenge by 
the plaintiffs and signaling the Court’s openness to apply this test to 
Major Political Players.164 
In his concurrence, Justice Alito embraced this idea, comparing 
the right to private association that the plaintiffs raised in Doe to the 
same rights that the NAACP and the SWP claimed.165 This 
comparison mischaracterizes not only the rationale behind the 
Buckley/SWP exemption, but also the nature, context, and likelihood 
of the harm present in Patterson and Socialist Workers’ Party.166 
 
 162. See generally Briffault, supra note 21 (discussing the effect of the Internet and social 
media on campaign finance and disclosure regulations). 
 163. Noveck, supra note 23, at 97 (explaining that the Buckley/SWP exemption “to disclosure 
requirements would only be necessary for small or fringe groups and that disclosure of 
contributors to major parties was constitutionally sound”). 
 164. See Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2821. 
 165. Id. at 2824–25 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 166. See Youn, supra note 151 (discussing how Patterson has been de-contextualized and 
distorted in the current debate on campaign finance disclosure). 
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When forging the as-applied standard for exemptions from 
disclosure, the Court in Buckley and Socialist Workers’ Party was 
heavily influenced by what had happened the previous decade in 
Patterson and Bates.167 By the time that the Court decided Patterson, 
the plaintiffs and other African Americans had already suffered years 
of harassment.168 Despite their nonviolent attempts to end segregation 
in the South, African Americans were terrorized by the use of lynch 
mobs, rapes, fire hoses, police dogs, and other acts of violence.169 For 
example, in the middle of the night on June 29, 1958, the day before 
the Court rendered its decision in Patterson, a bomb exploded at 
Bethel Baptist Church in Birmingham for the second time in two 
years.170 Its pastor, Fred Shuttlesworth, an active member of the civil 
rights movement and of the NAACP’s Alabama chapter, had been 
the target.171 In the case of NAACP members in Alabama and 
Arkansas in the fifties and sixties, the Court found that disclosure of 
their association with the NAACP posed “existential threats”172 to 
 
 167. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 70–71 
(1976) (reasoning that the government’s interest in disclosure is greatly diminished in the context 
of minor parties because minor party candidates’ ideological positions are generally more 
discernable and minor parties have less chance of winning, so the risk of corruption is lower). 
 168. In 1955, E. Frederick Morrow, the first African American White House staff member, 
submitted a file memo to the Eisenhower administration warning that “we are on the verge of a 
dangerous racial conflagration in the Southern section of the country.” Memorandum of Record 
from E. Frederick Morrow, Admin. Officer, Special Projects Grp., White House (Nov. 22, 1955) 
(on file with the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library), available at http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20040501070811/http://eisenhower.archives.gov/Dl/Civil_Rights_Emmett_Till_Case/EmmettTill
Case.html (follow “Page 1” hyperlink under “Memorandum for the Record, E. Frederick Morrow 
re: Emmett Till, November 22, 1955”). He noted, “a frightening power has been built in 
Mississippi by the anti-desegregation White Citizens Councils, and their principal method is one 
of economic terrorism. These Councils are fanning out throughout the South, and they have 
created a climate of fear and terrorism that holds the entire area in a vise.” Id. (follow “Page 2” 
hyperlink under “Memorandum for the Record, E. Frederick Morrow re: Emmett Till, November 
22, 1955”). 
 169. See generally Civil Rights Movement Timeline 1961, CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
VETERANS, http://www.crmvet.org/tim/timhis61.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2011) (giving a 
history and timeline of the Southern Freedom Movement in 1961). 
 170. Glenn T. Eskew, “The Classes and the Masses”: Fred Shuttlesworth’s Movement and 
Birmingham’s Black Middle Class, in BIRMINGHAM REVOLUTIONARIES: THE REVEREND FRED 
SHUTTLESWORTH AND THE ALABAMA CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 31, 39–40 
(Marjorie L. White & Andrew M. Manis eds., 2000). 
 171. Id. at 33, 37, 39–40. 
 172. See Paul Barton, Midterm Money Rush: The Secret Outsiders, CAP. NEWS CONNECTION 
(Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.capitolnewsconnection.org/news/midterm-money-rush-secret-
outsiders. 
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their lives and livelihoods as African Americans living in a racist 
society. 
The Court more appropriately applied the disclosure exemption 
several years later in Socialist Workers’ Party, where the plaintiffs 
were members of a political party with a sixty-person membership 
roll, and, consequently, the Court was concerned with the risk of 
silencing a fringe group.173 But in Doe, the plaintiffs were supporters 
of a popular cause, were never subjected to any government 
discrimination or hostility or severe and widespread harm, and were 
not members of a demographic minority. Rather, the petition signers 
endured harassment only while the petition was being circulated over 
a period of two months. Furthermore, the record of harassment 
against R-71 supporters included the relatively minor offenses of 
name-calling, threats to withdraw donations to a pastor’s church, 
argumentative phone calls, and a threatening blog post directed 
toward the family of the petition’s campaign manager.174 As a result, 
the plaintiffs primarily relied on the evidence of more egregious 
harassment against supporters of Proposition 8 in California.175 
Although courts may consider evidence of harassment of similarly 
situated groups when they apply the Buckley/SWP exemption, the 
plaintiffs in Doe offered evidence of harm that was far less grievous 
than that in Patterson and Socialist Workers’ Party. Therefore, the 
Court likely did not intend to apply an exemption that is “historically 
reserved for small groups [that] promot[e] ideas almost unanimously 
rejected” and that are vulnerable to serious retaliation to the plaintiffs 
in Doe, who offered little evidence of chilled speech or 
harassment.176 
If the Court were to broadly construe the Buckley/SWP 
exemption to apply to any group that shows a reasonable threat of 
harassment or intimidation, that would be a welcome development 
for Major Political Players. Bruce Josten, the executive vice 
president of government affairs for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
 
 173. Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88, 91, 98 (1982). 
 174. GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, CLAIMS OF HARASSMENT AND 
INTIMIDATION DOCUMENT REVIEW 21, 22, 66 (Apr. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/doe-v-reed/doe-v-reed-compiled-analysis.pdf. 
 175. See Petitioners’ Brief at 2–6, 10, supra note 128. 
 176. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also 
Youn, supra note 151 (discussing how the exemption was originally intended to protect harassed 
minority groups). 
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made clear the Chamber’s intent to seize on this exemption when  
ABC News pressed him on why the Chamber refused to open its 
books regarding political contributions if it had nothing to hide.177 
Josten pointed to the harassment that corporations like Target and 
individuals like the supporters of Proposition 8 incurred. Using the 
language of the Buckley/SWP exemption, he explained, “[The 
Chamber is] not going to subject its contributors to harassment, to 
intimidation, and to threats and to invasions of privacy at their 
houses and at their places of business, which is what has happened 
every time there’s been disclosure here.”178 It therefore appears that 
opponents of disclosure are preparing for the day when their best or 
only chance at remaining anonymous is to rely on the Buckley/SWP 
exemption—an exemption that was previously available only to 
minor parties. By failing to address this point in Doe, a case so 
drastically different from Patterson and SWP, the Court has 
unhooked this exemption from its theoretical moorings, signaling to 
Major Political Players that they may continue to attempt to skirt 
disclosure in this manner. 
IV.  THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AS  
“PROPER LEGAL MEANS”179:  
WHY ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS SHOULD NOT  
BE CONSIDERED HARASSMENT IN  
CLAIMS FOR AS-APPLIED EXEMPTIONS 
As Justice Kennedy stated in his majority opinion in Citizens 
United v. FEC,180 “disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to 
react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.”181 
Likewise, the economic boycott as a response to the speech of Major 
Political Players is a “proper legal means” of voicing dissenting 
opinions and the linchpin of why the boycott should therefore not be 
used as a justification for exemption from generally applicable 
disclosure rules. With the role of money in politics continuing to 
 
 177. Jake Tapper, Chamber of Commerce: The White House Wants Our Donor Lists So Its 
Allies Can Intimidate Our Donors, ABC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2010, 11:10 AM), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/10/chamber-of-commerce-the-white-house-wants-our-
donor-lists-so-its-allies-can-intimidate-our-donors/. 
 178. Id. 
 179. ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. 
 180. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 181. Id. at 916 (emphasis added). 
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increase and the 2012 election gearing up to be one of the most 
contentious and expensive in history,182 one issue likely to arise with 
greater frequency will be whether Major Political Players should be 
held accountable for their election-related spending. 
During the 2010 midterm elections, thirty-seven states decided 
160 ballot initiatives, most of which tackled hot-button issues such as 
the legalization of marijuana, affirmative action, abortion, and 
prenatal rights.183 In the aftermath of New York’s passage of a same-
sex marriage bill, many expect other states to also place same-sex 
marriage measures on the ballot in 2012.184 Recently, Minnesota185 
announced that it would compel disclosure of corporate donors who 
are involved in the movement to place an initiative on the 2012 ballot 
that bans same-sex marriage, despite claims that the donors could 
subsequently be subject to harassment.186 
Because it is probable that the collective citizenry will use 
economic boycotts to respond to some of these measures, one cannot 
ignore or minimize the pressing need for a determination regarding 
the lawfulness of this form of protest. Dissenting in Doe, Justice 
Thomas bemoaned the “elusive” standard of the Buckley/SWP 
exemption.187 He worried that the Court’s failure to articulate the 
evidence that is required to sustain an as-applied challenge would 
leave “a vacuum to be filled on a case-by-case basis. This will, no 
doubt, result in the ‘drawing of’ arbitrary and ‘questionable’ ‘fine 
distinctions’ by even the most well-intentioned district or circuit 
 
 182. The High Price of Anonymous Cash in American Political Campaigns, BLOOMBERG 
(June 5, 2011, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-06/the-high-price-of-
anonymous-cash-in-american-political-campaigns.html. 
 183. Voters to Decide on 160 Ballot Questions in 37 States, FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 2, 2010), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/02/voters-decide-ballot-initiatives-states/. 
 184. Nate Silver, The Future of Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Measures, N.Y. TIMES 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT BLOG (June 29, 2011, 10:35 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/06/29/the-future-of-same-sex-marriage-ballot-measures/. 
 185. Minnesota was a political hotbed in 2010 for corporate donations to the socially 
conservative PAC MN Forward. Minnesota was the main site for boycotts against Target and 
Best Buy, which are both headquartered in the state. Other corporations based in Minnesota that 
donated to MN Forward included 3M, Regis, Polaris, Securian, and Hubbard Broadcasting. Jim 
Spencer, U.S. Chamber Fights Donation Disclosure Rules, STAR TRIBUNE (May 7, 2011, 
5:21 PM), http://www.startribune.com/local/121409069.html. 
 186. Jillian Rayfield, NOM Loses Bid to Keep Anti-gay Marriage MN Donors Concealed out 
of ‘Harassment’ Fears, TPM MUCKRAKER (July 6, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://tpmmuckraker.talking 
pointsmemo.com/2011/07/nom_loses_bid_to_keep_anti-gay_marriage_mn_donors.php. 
 187. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2845 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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judge.”188 With no specific guidance from the Supreme Court as to 
what constitutes harassment, lower courts are at risk of overcrowding 
by those who seek to avoid disclosure by resorting to as-applied 
challenges that are based on behavior that has enjoyed constitutional 
protection for decades. 
The question at issue is why economic boycotts are so important 
as a protected First Amendment activity that the right to boycott 
cannot be sacrificed. The answers lie in an examination of the 
economic boycott’s role in advancing the core democratic principles 
of promoting diverse viewpoints in the marketplace and encouraging 
dissent. Both principles have long been considered fundamental to 
the functioning of democratic institutions. 
A.  The Economic Boycott  
in the Marketplace of Ideas 
Historically, the exchange of competing ideas in the search for 
truth has been one of the most important goals served by the First 
Amendment, which is designed “to secure ‘the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources’”189 and “to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.”190 The Framers of the Constitution, the most distinguished 
philosophers, and Supreme Court Justices have paid homage to the 
idea that more speech, not less, increases discussion about issues of 
public concern and therefore promotes the kind of free and open 
debate that the First Amendment not only fosters but demands.191 
Alexander Hamilton discussed the benefits of diverse opinions 
when he urged that “differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties 
in [the legislative] department of the government . . . often promote 
deliberation and circumspection; and serve to check the excesses of 
 
 188. Id. (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 888 (2010)). 
 189. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). 
 190. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 191. See Charles Fried & Cliff Sloan, Free Speech Worth Paying for, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 
2011, at A23. 
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the majority.”192 The English philosopher John Stuart Mill, a 
vigorous defender of free speech, echoed the same belief when he 
railed against the “tyranny of the majority,” arguing that society must 
safeguard minority views against the prevailing opinions of the 
majority and that the free flow of ideas is a necessary condition of 
progress and debate.193 To Mill, the “peculiar evil of silencing the 
expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race.”194 It 
was Mill’s embrace of the notion that unpopular ideas needed to be 
heard—not to benefit the holder of the opinion, but for the benefit of 
the greater society195—that influenced Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 
“marketplace of ideas” metaphor “that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.”196 Justice Brandeis took the theory a step further when he 
suggested that the remedy for speech that is threatening or 
inconvenient is “more speech, not enforced silence.”197 
Fast forward to Buckley and Citizens United, where the Court 
construed the concept that “more speech is better”198 first to allow 
unlimited expenditures by candidates199 and then to give corporations 
unfettered influence in elections by allowing them to expend 
unlimited sums of money to advocate for candidates.200 In Buckley, 
the Court affirmed that “restrict[ing] speech of some elements of our 
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment.”201 The argument that free speech 
should not be restrained was also decisive in Citizens United, when 
the Court struck down limits on corporate spending in elections, 
holding that corporate political expenditures is a form of First 
 
 192. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 146 (2003) (alteration in original) 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 426–27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 193. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10–11 (1986). 
 194. Id. at 23. 
 195. Id. at 23–30. 
 196. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 197. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 198. See Richard L. Hasen, Rich Candidate Expected to Win Again, SLATE (Mar. 25, 2011, 
7:08 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2289193/ (describing how the Court appears to apply the 
“more speech is better” justification inconsistently). 
 199. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15, 58–59 (1976). 
 200. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886, 896–99 (2010). 
 201. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49. 
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Amendment–protected speech.202 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Kennedy observed that “it is our law and our tradition that more 
speech, not less, is the governing rule.”203 To the Court, if one of the 
main goals of the First Amendment is to encourage as many points of 
view as possible, the corporate identity of the speaker does not 
justify a restriction on its right to speak.204 
Given this line of precedents, coupled with cases that grant the 
status of protected speech to economic boycotts, the Court should not 
allow Major Political Players to use the fear of economic boycotts to 
justify exemptions from disclosure requirements, because boycotts 
inject more speech into the marketplace. Characterizing economic 
boycotts as harassment would silence speech by impeding access to 
the information that those who organize boycotts need. That, in turn, 
would result in fewer diverse viewpoints entering the public arena 
and the cessation of valuable public dialogue. 
If the search for truth is a primary goal of the First Amendment, 
it follows that “[a]ll viewpoints must have an equal opportunity to 
compete in the intellectual marketplace, free from selective 
governmental regulation.”205 The economic boycott is a way for the 
weaker voices to be heard. If an individual disagrees with the way 
the Koch brothers, George Soros, Target, or other individuals or 
entities with vast financial resources and great access to tools of 
communication choose to spend their money, she can do little about 
it on her own. As the Court pointed out in Patterson, “Effective 
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly 
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.”206 
The very idea that a group of people object enough to the financing 
of a candidate or message to band together for the purpose of making 
their views known sends a strong message in itself. 
Unequal wealth in this country has led to unequal political 
influence. Major Political Players have the ability to hire lobbyists, 
finance think tanks, and direct cash to groups with sympathetic 
views. In the aftermath of Citizens United, if the Court extends a 
 
 202. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
 203. Id. at 911. 
 204. Id. at 912–13. 
 205. MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF 
DEMOCRACY 102 (2001). 
 206. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
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right of anonymity to corporate speech by allowing economic 
boycotts to serve as the basis of an exemption from disclosure, it 
would “result in a debate that bears the imprint of those forces that 
dominate the social structure.”207 The politically powerful would 
effectively continue to receive a free pass to exert disproportionate 
leverage over important social issues and political policy, thereby 
further distorting social power by silencing opposing points of view 
and impoverishing debate. As Justice Stevens argued in his dissent in 
Citizens United, corporate political expenditures “on a scale few 
natural persons can match” have the effect of “drowning out of 
noncorporate voices.”208 
I am not suggesting here the equality rationale that the Court 
rejected in Buckley209 and Citizens United.210 The Buckley 
admonishment against equalizing speech is consistent with the 
Court’s rejection of the economic boycott as harassment. The Court 
issued the admonishment in the context of striking down expenditure 
limits as an infringement on core political speech. There is no 
indication that this measure was intended to restrict citizens’ private 
actions to hold such expenditures to a minimum or to hold businesses 
accountable for such expenditures. Nor am I suggesting that the 
government should be called on to “equalize” voices by increasing 
its funding of disadvantaged parties, a concept that was squarely 
rejected in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett.211 The economic boycott is a purely private action that the 
Court should not regulate in the electoral context because doing so 
would only serve to make it much more difficult for private citizens 
to be heard at all. 
 
 207. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV 1405, 1412 (1986). 
 208. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 974 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 209. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (rejecting the government’s argument that 
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Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the 
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Finally, speakers—petition signers and donors to a ballot 
initiative—are not the only group in the electoral process to whom 
the First Amendment applies.212 Protecting the right of the listener to 
receive information and respond accordingly is fundamental to the 
concept of uninhibited discourse and debate: inherent in the idea of a 
debate is that at least two sides are exchanging ideas. If a business is 
going to make a campaign donation or organize support for a ballot 
initiative, then it must be prepared to deal with any lawful 
ramifications, including economic boycotts. In this context, the 
economic boycott is a constitutionally protected, organized response 
by consumers to constitutionally protected electoral “speech” by the 
businesses that they are boycotting. Allowing Major Political Players 
to rely on threats of economic boycotts as a justification for 
exemptions from disclosure in this context would victimize the 
listener by removing his ability to respond in the most effective 
manner. 
B.  Dissent and First Amendment Protection:  
Speaking Truth to Power213 
In Doe, the Court cited the fear of economic boycotts as 
evidence of harassment that could justify exemptions from 
disclosure. But allowing this claim would defy one of the primary 
goals of the First Amendment—enabling dissent—and would do so 
in the most critical aspect of democracy: the electoral process. While 
the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor allows more speakers, 
viewpoints, and opinions to join the conversation in a search for 
truth, the value of dissent is premised on the idea that criticism is 
 
 212. See Note, Overbreadth and Listeners’ Rights, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1761–66 (2010) 
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crucial to promoting a better democracy and assisting with self-
governance.214 
In discussing the economic boycott in Claiborne Hardware, the 
Court emphasized the need for debate on public issues and deferred 
to the idea that “expression on public issues ‘has always rested on the 
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’”215 
“[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is 
the essence of self-government.”216 In one of his many essays 
examining the relationship between self-government and free speech, 
Alexander Meiklejohn wrote,  
[C]onflicting views may be expressed, must be expressed, 
not because they are valid, but because they are relevant. If 
they are responsibly entertained by anyone, we, the voters, 
need to hear them . . . . To be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to 
be unfit for self government.217 
Cass Sunstein has argued that “at its core, [free speech] is designed 
to protect political disagreement and dissent.”218 In the electoral 
context, economic boycotts accomplish these objectives by 
challenging the status quo through active protest. They call attention 
to political behavior that might otherwise go unnoticed, and they 
hold parties accountable for their political activities, thereby 
promoting a more stable democracy. 
Just as flag burning and antiwar protests are considered 
protected speech because of their value as expressions of dissent, the 
economic boycott has a similar value in the electoral process: all of 
these activities are geared at changing social or political 
viewpoints.219 First Amendment scholar Steven Shiffrin, who defines 
dissent as “speech that criticizes existing customs, habits, traditions, 
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institutions, or authorities,”220 theorizes that “[t]he political bias of a 
dissent-centered conception of the First Amendment is for those who 
wish to challenge the status quo and for those who believe that 
society stagnates and furthers injustice when it is not open to 
challenge.”221 In this regard, the boycotters are speaking critically to 
those with more powerful economic voices; they are “speaking truth 
to power.” Their message is no different from messages that 
lobbyists deliver: if we agree with what you are doing, we will 
support you financially; if we disagree, we will withdraw our 
support. For that matter, the boycotters’ message is simply the 
inverse of that of the Major Political Players. Whereas the Major 
Political Players use their financial power to support a proposed 
governmental policy or candidate with which or whom they agree, 
the boycotters withhold their financial support to show that they 
disagree with these players. Both the Major Political Players and the 
boycotters use their economic clout to influence decision making. If, 
as Shiffrin posits, certain social beliefs may “more likely be 
testimony to . . . the interests of those in power than to their 
‘truth,’”222 then the “clashing of opinions”223 is critical to allow the 
citizenry to make the best decisions possible. 
Likewise, economic boycotts in the electoral process attempt to 
influence decision making by forcing valuable information about 
their targets into the sunlight.224 If, as Justice Brennan stated, the 
right of the collective citizenry to engage in “uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open” debate is inherent in the doctrine of free speech in a 
democracy,225 then citizens must have access to as much information 
as possible.226 In the case of campaign donations or ballot initiatives, 
this information would include the identification of the sponsor or 
sponsors of the speech, so that voters can adequately assess a 
sponsor’s motivation.227 Disclosure ensures that interested parties get 
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this information;228 economic boycotts ensure that the information 
will be thrust into the public eye.229 
Additionally, economic boycotts inform the business being 
boycotted that not only does a segment of the community disagree 
with its political activity but the segment holds the business 
accountable for its actions. The boycott of Target demonstrates the 
effectiveness of the economic boycott in forcing a corporation to 
make changes in its political policies and donations.230 Within three 
weeks of learning of the company’s donation to MN Forward, nearly 
62,000 people became fans of a Facebook group urging users to 
boycott Target.231 A YouTube video featuring a Target customer with 
a gay son became extremely popular, with almost 200,000 views by 
the beginning of August.232 As a result, in early 2011, Target 
announced that it had adopted new guidelines for making political 
donations, including the establishment of a new policy committee 
that would oversee the company’s political activities and be 
responsible for “balancing [its] business interests and other 
considerations that may be important to [its] team members, guests 
or other stakeholders.”233 The Target boycott also influenced an 
investor in another major company to propose a shareholder-
protection initiative.234 NorthStar Asset Management, an investment 
firm that owns shares of Home Depot, took notice of the $1.3 billion 
loss that Target faced immediately after its donation in August 
2010.235 Fearing a similar backlash to Home Depot’s political 
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spending, the fund introduced a shareholder resolution that would 
force Home Depot to disclose all political donations.236 While Home 
Depot’s management rejected the resolution, proponents of 
disclosure lauded the move as a “good first step” toward raising 
awareness and demanding change.237 
The economic boycott is also a necessary recourse that the 
public takes when the government has become unresponsive to the 
will of the people. Despite the fact that a large, bipartisan majority of 
the public disagrees with the holding in Citizens United,238 it is now 
the law of the land. To date, due to partisan disagreement,239 
Congress has been unwilling or unable to close the floodgates of 
corporate money flowing into elections. As a result, the economic 
boycott is becoming one of the few ways in which people can voice 
their disapproval of this specific law and policy while they 
subsequently send a public message of dissatisfaction to elected 
officials that the representatives must pass legislation or “fix” the 
problem in another way. 
The economic boycott as a tool of dissent must also be protected 
because it promotes political stability. When dissenters, boycotters, 
or dissidents voice their views outside of a Target or Best Buy or 
organize an Internet campaign to boycott a business, they do not 
always expect to effect change; sometimes they are just “letting off 
steam.” By taking action and making their voices heard, they are 
expressing their rejection of the current state of affairs and forcing 
their views into the political discourse, engaging in participatory 
democracy. In nondemocratic societies, dissent is more likely to be 
suppressed, “driv[ing] opposition underground, leaving those 
suppressed either apathetic or desperate. [Suppression] thus saps the 
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vitality of the society and makes resort to force more likely.”240 In 
exchange for our privilege of self-governance, “we agree to accept 
the results of the self-governing process, even if our idea is 
rejected.”241 It is our right to dissent, but it is our responsibility to 
give deference to the process that ensures this right. 
Finally, Shiffrin theorizes that in a democracy “it is not enough 
to tolerate dissent; dissent needs to be institutionally encouraged.”242 
He posits that one of the conditions for encouraging dissent is 
holding legal barriers to a minimum.243 In keeping with this idea, the 
Court should promote dissent by insisting on disclosure and rejecting 
the Major Political Players’ claims that economic boycotts are 
harassment. 
C.  Balancing the Equities 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has been the most outspoken 
opponent of disclosure for corporations.244 Its logic has remained 
consistent: if you force our association and similar groups or 
businesses to disclose, then we will be vulnerable to retaliation, and 
you will risk chilling our speech and hurting society as a whole.245 
The Chamber claims that compelled disclosure will result in 
harassment such as economic boycotts, citing the Target example as 
a reason why President Obama must not sign the proposed executive 
order that would require strict federal disclosure rules for 
government contractors.246 But if economic boycotts are protected 
First Amendment speech, and the Court has adhered to a long line of 
precedent that gives priority to more speech in the marketplace, why 
would the Court undermine the value of economic boycotts as 
expressive activity by allowing them to be deemed harassment and 
grounds for exemptions from disclosure? The answer would have to 
rest in a determination by the Court that, on balance, the harm that 
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disclosure causes, either in terms of its chilling effect on political 
activity or infringing on rights of privacy, outweighs the state 
interests that such disclosure serves. A plethora of scholarship has 
been devoted to this subject, but here I will attempt to analyze why I 
believe that, in the case of Major Political Players, the value of 
economic boycotts trumps either of the so-called harms that they 
may inflict. 
The petitioners in both ProtectMarriage.com and Doe v. Reed 
argued that disclosure would undermine participation in the political 
process. As discussed above, Justice Alito was convinced that this 
was true in Doe, concluding that “[t]he widespread harassment and 
intimidation suffered by supporters of California’s Proposition 8 
provides strong support for an as-applied exemption in the present 
case.”247 Admittedly, instances of individuals who contribute small 
amounts to campaigns or ballot initiatives and as a result suffer 
retaliation in the form of economic boycotts give rise to troubling 
questions.248 This was the case for Marjorie Christofferson, whose 
family owns the popular Los Angeles restaurant El Coyote, and who 
donated $100 in 2008 to support the passage of Proposition 8.249 
After Christofferson’s contribution was publicly disclosed, 
opponents of Proposition 8 relied on the Internet to quickly organize 
boycotts of the restaurant and discredit it in an effort to discourage 
people from patronizing it.250 Business declined more than 
30 percent, forcing management to cut employees’ hours and close 
the restaurant at lunch.251 The Court cited instances such as this in 
both ProtectMarriage.com and Doe.252 
It is difficult to argue that small donors or ordinary signatories to 
ballot initiatives individually pose a compelling need for disclosure 
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when the harm to them can be very great and the benefit to society of 
knowing their identities is quite miniscule in terms of advancing any 
substantial state interests. In these cases, disclosure does not help the 
public identify or evaluate the special interests that are trying to 
influence an election, nor does it help the public better understand 
the motivations of these parties. Instead, for a regular individual such 
as Christofferson who works at or owns a small business, disclosure 
could lead to a boycott that has the potential to be catastrophic, 
decimating the business and stripping the individual of her 
livelihood. Threats of boycotts in these situations could clearly 
discourage political involvement, thus stifling First Amendment 
objectives. To avoid this possibility, one suggestion that appears to 
have gained traction is that both the federal and state governments 
could raise the financial threshold that is applicable to compelled 
disclosure.253 Currently, federal law mandates disclosure for 
donations of $200 or more, and many state laws have threshold 
requirements as low as $20–$100.254 This would address the privacy 
and harassment concerns by automatically exempting ordinary, small 
donors. 
But one should not conflate the impact that economic boycotts 
can have on regular individuals with their impact on Major Political 
Players, such as Target or a business that the Koch brothers own, 
which are far better situated to withstand any potential economic 
pressure. A higher monetary threshold for disclosures would isolate 
these wealthier donors, whose contributions have a greater impact 
and whose motives should be more closely scrutinized. When “big 
fish” are allowed to go unchecked in their quest to avoid disclosure, 
they are able to exert undue influence in the electoral process. The 
unrestricted dollars that Major Political Players contribute to the 
coffers of issue groups or candidates have exacerbated this 
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problem.255 For example, last November three oil companies 
contributed more than $8 million to support Proposition 23 in 
California, which sought to suspend existing and proposed 
regulations to address global warming,256 and which would have 
directly benefitted the companies’ businesses if it had been 
successful. Further emboldened by the ruling in Citizens United, 
corporations and independent associations representing special 
interests spent upward of $305 million in the 2010 elections,257 and 
large corporations, such as Prudential Financial, Dow Chemical, 
Goldman Sachs, and Chevron Texaco, were among those that 
contributed more than $1 million to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
to support various issue campaigns.258 
Compounding these large expenditures has been the trend of 
Major Political Players concealing their identities and thus 
attempting to avoid accountability for their actions259 by funneling 
their money through third-party, nonprofit PACs that are organized 
under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.260 If the Court 
allows these organizations to continue in this manner, Major Political 
Players will continue to influence elections and campaigns while 
they remain hidden from the public eye. This secrecy poses a serious 
threat to the decision-making ability of the electorate, who have a 
right to know who is supporting a political cause and who would 
stand to benefit from the outcome. Even scholars who argue in favor 
of affording more weight to privacy and anonymity in this process 
acknowledge the “importance of scale”261 and recognize the value 
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that is gleaned by exposing these groups, whose “large donations . . . 
effectively bankroll a candidate or ballot initiative.”262 
This argument of scale can also be used to distinguish the 
Court’s upholding of anonymity in McIntyre while rejecting it in 
Doe. In McIntyre, the speech of one individual might have been 
silenced if she had been forced to identify herself.263 Major Political 
Players can and do make the same argument that compelled 
disclosure will chill their speech. On balance, however, large 
corporations and wealthy individuals are far better equipped to 
defend themselves against the consequences of their participation in 
the process, and I argue that the right of the electorate to know about 
large donations outweighs any such claim that Major Political 
Players might make. First, the state’s interest in informing voters of 
who is supporting candidates or initiatives is far more compelling in 
light of the political clout that Major Political Players wield, and the 
economic boycott is an effective tool for exposing and criticizing 
those with disproportionately powerful voices. Second, in situations 
where Major Political Players are supporting a view that the general 
public commonly holds, which was the case in both 
ProtectMarriage.com and Doe, reliance on a harassment claim that is 
historically reserved for minor parties is disingenuous at best. Third, 
the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to be free of 
criticism for speech. If Major Political Players inject themselves into 
the political process in ways that can influence entire elections, they 
must exhibit “civic courage” and be willing to face the consequences 
of their actions. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurring 
opinion in Doe, “The right [of freedom of speech] . . . is the right to 
speak, not the right to speak . . . anonymously.”264 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This Note has the limited goal of exploring a question that the 
Supreme Court has not answered: can Major Political Players that 
have made large donations or lent organized support to ballot 
initiatives use threats of economic boycotts, which are protected First 
Amendment activity, as justification for exemptions from disclosure? 
As a result of Citizens United, Americans go into the 2012 voting 
cycle facing unlimited campaign spending on ads that were paid for 
by PACs and nonprofits about whom we will know little other than 
the name that they use for advertising. Voters will be making 
decisions on critical issues, including the election of a president, 
“knowing less about those trying to shape their views . . . than they 
have since secret money helped finance the Watergate burglary and 
re-elect President Richard Nixon in 1972.”265 Data from the Center 
for Responsive Politics show that outside conservative and 
overwhelmingly Republican organizations outspent liberal, 
Democrat-leaning groups by about two to one in general, and by 
seven to one when donors were kept secret.266 
There has been plenty of push back from the Democratic Obama 
administration in an effort to curtail the effects of Citizens United. In 
March 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission agreed 
with NorthStar Asset Management, a Home Depot shareholder, that 
Home Depot must include on its ballot a proposal requiring the board 
to disclose its policies on electioneering contributions and consult 
with its shareholders on such policies.267 This was a sharp reversal of 
existing corporate law rules, which had previously considered 
corporate political speech decisions as ordinary business decisions 
that did not require input from shareholders.268 In April 2011, a draft 
executive order was leaked; it required any government contractor to 
disclose political contributions exceeding $5,000 that its executives 
made to organizations that engage in political advertising, including 
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501(c) organizations and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.269 In May 
2011, it became known that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sent 
letters to five donors to nonprofit advocacy groups that were 
organized under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code; the 
letters stated that the donors could be liable for gift taxes on their 
donations.270 The IRS dropped that effort in July 2011 under pressure 
from conservative groups, who argued that the decision to audit 
those donors was politically motivated and potentially in violation of 
the First Amendment.271 A Wall Street Journal op-ed denounced the 
leaked executive order as an effort to “veto the Supreme Court” 
decision in Citizens United and to “suppress corporate political 
activity,” invoking the Patterson decision and its warning of the 
potential for economic retaliation, and also pointing to the 
harassment that supporters of Proposition 8 faced.272 “[I]f the 
president succeeds in reducing the free-speech rights of business 
today, it will be far easier to limit the same rights of other Americans 
tomorrow,” the op-ed threatened.273 But none of these “remedies” are 
aimed at individuals like Margaret McIntyre or Marjorie 
Christofferson. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the 
businesses that complain about forced disclosure are, for the most 
part, Fortune 500 companies that are looking to influence elections 
and campaigns while they stay hidden from the public eye and 
insulated from any consequences. 
In a society that has become increasingly politically polarized, it 
is imperative that the Supreme Court set guideposts for the battles to 
come over the use of the economic boycott in the electoral process. 
If, in fact, our elections are to be fair and open, and if they are to 
embody the historically enunciated First Amendment goals 
encouraging free speech and open debate, the Court should take an 
active role both in determining what activity constitutes harassment 
and in curtailing claims that do not merit that designation. While the 
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Court’s embrace of compelled disclosure in both Citizens United and 
Doe indicates its willingness to increase the information that is 
available to the electorate, the Court must now go one step further: it 
must preclude Major Political Players from impeding the right of the 
citizenry to engage in economic boycotts by turning such activity 
into claims for harassment.274 
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